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The aim of this paper is to analyse the state enterprise sector in Russia in terms of its origin, 
economic significance, principles of operation and efficiency. State-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and those dependent on the state – constituting about 30–40% of the full potential of 
the Russian economy – are particularly strongly represented within the largest Russian com-
panies, in sectors defined as strategic. Therefore, th  classification, legal basis and forms of 
the above-mentioned enterprises will be analysed. It appears that Russian state-owned en-
terprises operate according to an entirely different set of rules than companies in developed 
countries and this situation is likely to be intentio al.  
This study will be conducted on the basis of official statistics, a few empirical studies 
and the analysis of international literature (mainly contained in the various studies conduct-
ed by organisations such as the OECD and the World Bank). The following analyses will be 
carried out: the analysis of legal acts concerning SOEs in Russia, the presence of SOEs will 
be analysed across the ranking list of the largest Russian companies (including the Top 400 
list). Studies of scientific papers in Russian and E glish will also be carried out.  
Knowledge on the functioning of the Russian state-owned enterprises and information 
about the model of corporate governance used in this country (corporate governance of the 
country) are very limited. Moreover, in papers by various authors one can find ambiguous or 
even contradictory opinions. This results mostly from differences in the assumptions and def-
initions, or simply from the use of unreliable / incomplete data. The author expects that this 
paper will result in the creation of a clear, dependable and objective image of the Russian 
state-owned enterprise sector. 
During the past twenty years of the Russian transformation there have been two op-
posite processes in the field of state property. The first one is privatisation and the second 
one is the process of strengthening the presence of the state in certain branches of the Rus-
sian economy. These two processes will be analyzed in this paper. This analysis will clearly 
show that despite a huge decline in the SOE sector af e the transformation, this sector is 
still very significant to the Russian economy. Moreover, these enterprises play a crucial role, 
since they are concentrated in the most strategic sectors, and are more profitable and have 
other competitive advantages over private enterprises. 
                                                   
 
1 The project was financed by the National Science Centre pursuant to the decision number DEC-
2012/05/N/HS4/00507. 
134 Paweł Augustynowicz 
 
Keywords: State-owned enterprise, Russia, strategic sectors 
1. Introduction 
Even after twenty years from the collapse of the socialist regime the state is still 
very strongly present in the Russian economy. This ha  a vast impact on both the 
regulatory and institutional, as well as ownership areas. State-owned enterprises (al-
so dependent on the state) have a dominant share in some of the largest Russian 
companies. They also play a very crucial role in many strategic industries (see Table 
1 below). The Russian economy and the Chinese one, are the only major economies 
in the world, in which state enterprises are so important. 
Table 1. The structure of privatised enterprises by form of state ownership in the  
period 1993-2011 
Year 
Number of privatised en-
terprises - total 
Including, by form of state ownership 
Federal Local Municipal 
1993 42924 7063 9521 26340 
1994 21905 5685 5112 11108 
1995 10152 1875 1317 6960 
1996 4997 928 715 3354 
1997 2743 374 548 1821 
1998 2129 264 321 1544 
1999 1536 104 298 1134 
2000 2274 170 274 1830 
2001 2287 125 231 1931 
2002 2557 86 226 2245 
2003 434 161 152 121 
2004 502 121 246 135 
2005 491 112 226 153 
2006 444 98 254 92 
2007 302 73 115 114 
2008 260 26 135 99 
2009 366 140 87 139 
2010 217 97 56 64 
2011 276 119 80 77 
Source: Own calculation based on (Goskomstat 2004, 2005), Tables 13.10 and 13.11. 
 
The role, scope and current way of functioning of SOEs in Russia is unique, 
not only among the largest economies in the world, but also among the group of 
post-socialist countries, where the dominance of state ownership was a natural fea-
ture of the previous economic system. Russia, becaus  of its distinctiveness (that re-
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sulted from its size and geographical location, wealth in natural resources and impe-
rial ambitions), has always followed a specific economic policy. The tradition of the 
state as the main guardian of the economy, also in terms of ownership, has in Russia 
a long and established position. 
After changing its political and economic systems in the early 1990s, the Rus-
sian economy, like other post-socialist economies, experienced a period of rapid and 
spontaneous privatisation. As a result, there was a ri e of the whole new sector of 
formally private enterprises, that often had their majority stakes owned by the pri-
vate capital and the minority stakes owned by the sate capital. Nonetheless, these 
enterprises were still highly dependent on state policy. However, after a few years 
even these highly controversial privatisations were halted. Since 2005, Russia has 
increased the share of the state sector in the economy (EBRD 2009). 
Both in the English and Russian literature there are only a few significant 
publications containing the analysis of the state ent rprise sector in Russia and cor-
porate governance issues of the state. Papers dated 2000–2005 (based mainly on the 
data from the 1990s) are now rather obsolete and outdated. Furthermore, they often 
contain contradictory results regarding both the scale and efficiency of state enter-
prises in Russia. Russian studies in general positively evaluate the process of change 
in ownership and the resulting efficiency of the private sector in the 1990s 
(Степашин 2004, Радыгин–Мальгинов 2001). The existence and functioning of 
the state enterprise sector in this period has beenconsidered as having had a nega-
tive impact on the economy. These statements are not consistent with the conclu-
sions of researchers from outside Russia, where the efficiency of both public and 
private sectors in the 1990s in the Russian economy has been severely criticised 
(Perevalov et al. 2000). 
Recent studies on the functioning of state-owned enterprises also provide con-
flicting data. An econometric analysis shows a significant positive effect of state 
ownership on the quality of corporate governance in Russia in 2001−2004 (Ya-
kovlev 2008). This can be explained by the change in government policy in the 
sphere of privatisation and state property management, which took place after 2000 
(Yakovlev 2011). Other data indicate a positive impact of state capital on the quality 
of corporate governance in this period (Avdasheva 2007). A number of studies rep-
resent a distinct view, providing an extensive list of arguments that point to a lower 
efficiency and poor corporate-governance practices in Russian enterprises. Sprenger 
(2010) presents a review of literature in this area and a set of arguments about the 
unreliability of the state as an owner within the Russian economy. 
These conclusions are confirmed by the recent Western publications concern-
ing the analysis of the transformation processes. The state is generally considered as 
a poor owner in post-socialist economies (Estrin et al. 2009, pp. 699-728., Hanousek 
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et al. 2009, pp. 43-73.). Note, however, that these claims are based on data from 
smaller countries, with a slightly different history, such as the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland. Therefore, one can doubt, whether it is possible to generalise 
the theory to cover this very special case of the Russian economy. 
2. The definition and classification of SOEs in Russia 
There is no unified definition of a state-owned enterprise in Russia, neither in offi-
cial documents, nor in the scientific literature. This term can denote a whole spec-
trum of entities. It can be given to enterprises with 100 percent share of the state 
capital, as well as to entities with majority shareholdings, and to firms with minority 
state shareholding that still allows it to enjoy actu l corporate-governance rights. 
The legal basis for the functioning of state enterprises in the modern Russian 
economy is regulated by a number of different acts. The Civil Code of the Russian 
Federation lists three possible legal forms of enterprises: 
1. The biggest enterprises from the public domain are mainly joint-stock 
companies (so-called open companies). This legal form provides the pri-
vate capital with the opportunity to take a share in the ownership, as well 
as with the ability to conquer foreign stock-exchange markets. 
2. Unitary enterprise is a specific form of organisation and operation of en-
terprises with 100 percent state ownership in Russia. Unitary enterprises 
do not own any property that still belongs to the state, as represented by 
the federal, regional (republics, oblasts, etc.) or local (in the case of munic-
ipal enterprises) entities. Unitary enterprises are li ble for their obligations 
in respect of all the assets that cannot be divided nto shares or equity – 
they always remain owned by the state. Business managers of unitary en-
terprises have to obtain approvals for most of their d cisions. This often 
results in the emergence of allegations against “manual control” applied to 
these enterprises. 
3. Another specific product of the Russian state property-management model 
are state corporations, which are partly business entities and partly state 
agencies (non-profit organisations). The legal basis for the creation of state 
corporations has existed since 1999. Each of these operates under a sepa-
rate law. Therefore, they have very little in common. Generally, one can 
say that these companies: 
- are relatively independent from the state-owner; 
- are the sole owners of their assets; 
- have limited disclosure obligations to the state. 
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3. The size of SOE sector in Russia and it’s change over time 
The SOE sector within the Russian economy was an object of significant and un-
precedented changes during the transformation period. Russian policymakers decid-
ed to apply a fairly radical approach to change, which implied a rapid change in 
ownership within the economy. An in-depth analysis of these events in the most tur-
bulent period of the privatisation process (in 1991−1994) is virtually impossible due 
to the fact, that there is almost no official statistics on the said period.  
The first spontaneous processes of privatisation in the Russian economy could 
already be observed in 1991. However, at the end of that year, the structure of the 
economy still had a negligible share of the private property. By the end of 1991, the 
share of private ownership in the economy had reached 4.2% (Степашин 2004, p. 
82.). 
According to the Central Statistical Office of the Russian Federation, befor 
the start of the rapid privatisation, the state of SOEs was as follows: 
- 349.3 thousand of state-owned enterprises belonging to all levels of govern-
ment (national, federal, and municipal) with total assets valued at 35.6 billion 
rubles; 
- 80.1 thousand of non-business organisations with total assets valued at 24.1 
billion rubles (Goskomstat 1992). 
 
These data suggest that the value of the state property, that could hypotheti-
cally be privatised, amounted to 35.6 billion rubles. However, this approach is too 
simplified, since companies in the Soviet Union had a completely different nature, 
and even the definition of an enterprise was far from the definition accepted by to-
day’s market economy. Therefore, not all of the nearly 350 thousand companies 
could be called companies. In contrast, a number of o ganisations (among the above-
mentioned 80 thousand that were categorised as non-e terprise entities) could have 
features specific to a typical enterprise. This applies to many holiday resorts and so-
cial facilities belonging to different types of departments of the state apparatus. In 
subsequent years, these units had been separated from their parent units and success-
fully became the subject of privatisation proceedings. 
The acceleration of the privatisation process can be associated with the en-
actment of two documents important from the perspectiv  of the process: 
- The Ordinance on the introduction of the system of privatisation vouchers in 
the Russian Federation (dated 14 August 1992); 
- The Ordinance on the expansion of the system of privatisation vouchers in the 
Russian Federation (of 14 October 1992). 
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The above-mentioned regulations allowed for non-monetary methods of pri-
vatisation. Namely, they introduced vouchers (also kn wn as privatisation certifi-
cates) as a means of settlement in privatisation tra sactions. The moment of intro-
duction of these laws could be considered as the beginning of mass privatisation and 
decline in the SOE sector in Russia. 
The scarce data from the beginning of the privatisation period mentions about 
36.8 thousand state-owned enterprises privatised in 1991−1992, while in 1993 this 
number amounted to 42.9 thousand and dropped to 21.9 thousand in 1994. As shown 
in Figure 1, the years 1993 and 1994 were particularly abundant in privatisation 
transactions, while in 1995−1997 the number of privatisations fell, and in subse-
quent years it remained at a relatively low level. 













1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
National Local Municipal
 
Source: Own calculation based on (Goskomstat 2004, 2005), Tables 13.10 and 13.11. 
 
Table 1 shows the details of the number of enterprises privatised between 
1993 and 2011, broken down by various forms of ownership before privatisation. A 
sharp decline in the number of enterprises privatised in 2003 may be noted. Data 
broken down by form of ownership show that this declin  was associated with a 
shrinkage in the number of privatised enterprises owned by the Municipality (from 
2,245 in 2002 to 121 in 2003). 
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Figure 2 shows the share of municipal, local and federal forms of ownership 
in the structure of enterprises privatised in select d years. In the period 1993−2002 
municipal enterprises were by far the largest group, which accounted for more than 
half of all the privatised enterprises. In the years 2002−2011 the share of municipal 
enterprises was much smaller. In 2004−2008 companies owned by local govern-
ments took the lead, and in the years 2009−2011 the majority of privatisation trans-
actions applied to federal enterprises. This division reflects the different strategies of 
privatisation across these years. Municipal enterprises definitely comprise the largest 
group, but they are very small entities. By contrast, federal companies were general-
ly much larger units, most of which were sold out in 1992–1995 (see Table 1). 
Figure 2. The share of the different forms of state ownership in the structure of pri-










Source: Own calculation based on (Goskomstat 2004, 2005), Tables 13.10, 13.11; and (Gos-
komstat 2012), Table 13.10. 
 
One of the natural consequences of changes in the own rship structure of the 
economy of Russia is the change in the employment structure. Table 2 contains data 
on the employment within the Russian economy (and in the case of the period 
1970−1990 in the economy of the USSR). It is worth noting that − according to offi-
cial Figures − certain activities in the USSR were treated as employment in the pri-
vate sector. 
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Table 2. The structure of employment in the Russian and former Soviet Union  
economy in years 1970−2010 by type of ownership, in% 
Type of ownership 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
State 86 88.8 90.4 91.1 82.6 42.1 37.8 33.7 30.4 
Private 14 11.2 9.6 8.9 12.5 34.4 46.1 54.1 58.6 
Mixed Russian ... ... ... ... 4.0 22.2 12.6 7.8 5.7 
NGOs and religious organisations ... ... ... ... 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.5 
Foreign and mixed Russian-foreign ... ... ... ... 0.1 0.6 2.7 3.8 4.8 
Total within the Russian economy 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Own calculations based on (Goskomstat 2003) Table 6.5; (Goskomstat 2007) Table 
5.5; and (Goskomstat 2012) Table 5.4. 
 
Figure 3 presents more detailed data on the structure of employment by type 
of ownership in recent years. Several important trends should be emphasized here. 
An increase in the share of employment in the private sector and the decline in em-
ployment in the state sector seem to be obvious. But the level of employment in the 
private sector, according to the latest data, still remains relatively small. Only 58.8% 
of the economically active population were employed in the private sector as at the 
end of 2011. The issue of employment in the sector kn wn as a mixed state-private 
deserves an in-depth examination. These are of course nothing else that state-owned 
enterprises with the participation of private capitl or private enterprises with the 
participation of state capital. However, as was already mentioned, these companies 
are still strictly controlled by the government, so they can be included into the do-
main of the SOEs. Therefore, state-owned enterprises and enterprises controlled by 
the state employed 35.7% of the economically active population, 5% were employed 
in enterprises with foreign capital, and 0.5% − in other organisations. Another note-
worthy fact is the decline in the share of mixed ownership during the transition pro-
cess. In 1995, the share of employment in this sector was 22.2%, but at the end of 
2011 this share already declined to no more than 6.3%. This may be a consequence 
of the policy in the sphere of privatization, involing the so-called residual privatisa-
tion, i.e. the sale of shares in these companies in wh ch the state has only partial par-
ticipation. 
Over the past 20 years, the Russian labour market has strongly changed its 
image. The share of employment in the public and mixed sectors fell from 86.6% in 
1990 to 35.7% in 2011, and in late 2000 and early 2001, the share of employment in 
sectors dependent on the state fell below 50%. 
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Figure 3. The structure of employment in the Russian and former Soviet-Union 
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Source: Own calculations based on (Goskomstat 2003) Table 6.5; (Goskomstat 2007) Table 
5.5; and (Goskomstat 2012) Table 5.4. 
 
In summary, the level of employment is one of the indirect measures to esti-
mate the scope of the domination of the state within t e economy. Of course, the use 
of this measure may lead to some distortion, because − in general – companies in the 
public sector have a higher level of employment compared to private companies. On 
the other hand, it can be assumed that the state sector in Russia − due to its concen-
tration in highly profitable and monopolistic areas – plays even more important role 
than it seems at first glance. 
4. Other indirect measures of the SOE sector in Russia 
Statistical data on the Russian economy, especially that regarding the state-owned 
enterprise sector, published by the National Bureau of Statistics (Goskomstat), can 
be considered as unreliable. Due to the fact that there are fundamental differences in 
the statistical methodology, and also because of the various accepted definitions of 
analysed companies, we can speak of a strong inconsiste cy in Russian statistics 
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compared to data from European countries, that are members of Eurostat. The diffi-
culty in accessing these data follows from the facttha  some Russian statistical pub-
lications are not distributed abroad. Moreover, until the end of the 1990s, the Rus-
sian statistical offices did not keep up in their studies with the turbulent changes in 
the real economic system. For this reason, there was often a problem that certain sets 
of data from this period did not have the continuity, definitions and classifications of 
the studied phenomena and processes were changing si nificantly over time. Russia 
does not belong to the OECD, and consequently many important issues are not in-
cluded in OECD reports, or are included to a very limited extent. What is more, 
there is no unified database of SOEs (or at least none that would be accessible to the 
scientific community). Even commercial databases do not include information on 
the ownership structure of Russian companies. 
Therefore, the share of the SOE sector within the Russian economy could on-
ly be estimated using various indirect measurements. At empts to do this have been 
made by the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development. According to the 
EBRD report produced in 2009, the share of the public sector (which is of course a 
broader term than the SOE sector share) in the Russian GDP amounts to about 35%, 
although in 2004 it amounted to 30% (EBRD 2009). Unfortunately, the report does 
not disclose the underlying methodology for the calcul tions used to measure this.  
Another estimation of the economic significance of the SOEs sector could be 
made by means of analysing the TOP400 list of Russian enterprises. This ranking 
provides i.a. information on revenues and profits across the largest Russian compa-
nies. Among them there is a considerable number of SOEs.  
Table 3 shows a list of 25 largest enterprises in Russia. It is worth noting that, 
out of the total of 25 included in this list, there are 10 state-owned enterprises. 
Moreover, the revenues of state enterprises on this list exceed those of private com-
panies by USD 81 billion. Compared with the total revenues of the 400 largest en-
terprises in Russia (TOP-400), the revenues of the first 10 state-owned enterprises 
account for almost 30% of the total. The advantage of SOEs is even more significant 
when it comes to comparing profits. The largest 10 state companies generate more 
than 53% of profits compared to the profits of enterprises form the whole TOP-400 
list.  
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Table 3. Revenues, net profits and ownership of the first 25 companies from the 








2013, in USD  
billion 
Net profit in 
2013, in USD 
million 
1 "Gazprom"  SOE 153.3 38950 
2 The oil company "Lukoil"  private 116.3 10925 
3 The oil company "Rosneft"  SOE 67.5 11004 
4 Railways  SOE 49.6 2518 
5 Sberbank of Russia  SOE 43.3 11194 
6 "TNK-BP Holding"  private 39.9 9009 
7 AFK "System"  private 34.2 947 
8 "Surgutneftegaz"  SOE 27.3 5796 
9 "Transneft"  SOE 23.6 5933 
10 "IDGC Holding"  SOE 20.0 1018 
11 VTB Group  SOE 19.8 2915 
12 The "Inter RAO"  private 17.9 -719 
13 X5 Retail Group  private 15.8 -127 
14 "Evraz"  private 14.7 -335 
15 "Magnet"  private 14.4 808 
16 "Tatneft"  SOE 14.3 2524 
17 "Severstal"  private 14.1 762 
18 "Stroygazkonsalting"  private 12.5 b.d 
19 NLMK (NLMK)  private 12.2 596 
20 MMC "Norilsk Nickel"  private 12.1 2143 
21 "Mechel"  private 11.3 -1665 
22 "VimpelCom"  private 10.9 2280 
23 The combined company "Rusal"  private 10.9 -337 
24 "SGM"  private 10.4 954 
25 "Rostelecom"  SOE 10.3 1134 
 TOTAL SOEs   429.1 (29.4%) 82986 (53.1%) 
 TOTAL private  347.7 25241 
 TOTAL for the TOP-400  1457.5 156214 
Source: Own calculation based on data from RA Expert, www.raexpert.ru 
5. Conclusions 
The research conducted within this paper reveals a whole list of methodological is-
sues that hinder the proper examination of the state-owned enterprises sector within 
the Russian economy. The main limitation is the lack of reliable data on this subject. 
Another problem is connected with the term "state-owned enterprise" itself. This 
term applies to the whole list of different entities that have different parameters of 
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operation. Unitary enterprises are very widespread at the municipal level and repre-
sent mainly utility services. These companies have be n partially privatised, since 
they are not very attractive for the government. When analysing privatisation data, 
SOEs from the local and municipal levels were the main targets for privatisation, es-
pecially during the first decade of the transformation.  
In contrast, joint-stock companies that are owned by the Russian government 
are big and powerful enterprises that often operate within very profitable sectors of 
the economy and are considered as the “blue chips” of the Russian economy. The 
analysis of the TOP-400 list shows that the largest SOEs often surpass their private 
counterparts in terms of revenue and profits.  
The scope of the research conducted within this paper has not covered the 
analysis of the SOEs that are organised in the formof state corporations, but many 
facts suggest that this form of state-owned enterprises is the least transparent one. 
Every single state corporation is established by a separate law. These legal acts often 
give some privileges to state corporations. This leads to numerous instances of un-
fair competition with the private sector, separate (pr ferential) procedures for access 
to capital and lower disclosure requirements (Sprenger 2010, pp. 90-110.). 
All of the abovementioned facts suggest that the state-owned enterprises sec-
tor within the Russian economy is divided into two structurally different subsectors: 
small obsolete enterprises that often operate within the utilities sector and which are 
the remnants of the bygone era of communism, and big corporations that are very 
important for their owner (the Russian state). The first subgroup is a burden for the 
economy and must be eliminated as fast as possible. The second one plays a very 
important – if not the leading – role within the Russian economy.  
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